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Abstract
 
Geographical indications (GIs)—i.e. indications identifying goods 
originating in a specific place and having quality, characteristics, 
and reputation attributable to their geographical origin—are de-
veloping fast in the Southeast Asian food sector, with a wide range 
of new products such as Khao Hom Mali and Thung Kula Rong-Hai 
(fragrant rice), Kampot pepper, or Nuoc Mam Phu Quoc (fish sauce). 
After concentrating their efforts on registering GIs (to protect the 
name against counterfeit), GI promoters needed to decide how to 
control product compliance with GI specifications for specific qual-
ity. This paper analyzes the control and certification procedures for 
GIs in four Southeast Asian countries—Thailand, Vietnam, Cam-
bodia, and Laos—and the challenges faced in building an efficient 
yet appropriate system of controls in these countries. Influenced 
by the “gold standard” of certification in place of organic agricul-
ture, finding appropriate GI control systems is one of the dilemmas 
faced by these countries. The article discusses the main differences 
between GIs and other agricultural standards—specifications that 
are unique to each GI, endogenous, and based on local production 
practices—and the consequences in terms of certification. Indeed, 
in the case of GIs, other options than private third-party certifica-
tion could better ensure that GI rules are followed, which may rely 
on the knowledge producers and connoisseurs have of the product.
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Resumen
 
Las indicaciones geográficas (GIs)—por ejemplo, indicaciones que 
identifican bienes que originan en algún lugar específico y que tie-
nen una calidad, características y reputación que se le pueden atri-
buir a su origen geográfico—están teniendo un rápido desarrollo 
en el sector alimenticio del sudeste asiático, con un rango amplio 
de nuevos productos como Khao Hom Mali y Thung Kula Rong-
Hai (arroz aromático), Pimienta de Kampot o Nuoc Mam Phu Quoc 
(salsa de pescado). Después de concentrar sus esfuerzos en registrar 
GIs (para proteger el nombre contra las falsificaciones), los promo-
tores de las GIs necesitan decidir cómo controlar el cumplimiento 
del producto con las especificaciones de las GIs para una calidad 
específica. Este documento analiza los procedimientos de control y 
certificación para las GIs en países del sudeste asiático—Tailandia, 
Vietnam, Camboya y Laos—y los desafíos que se enfrentan al crear 
sistemas de controles que sean eficientes y también apropiados en 
estos países. Bajo la influencia del “estándar dorado” de la certifi-
cación en lugar de la agricultura orgánica, encontrar sistemas de 
control de GIs apropiados es uno de los dilemas que enfrentan es-
tos países. Este artículo discute las principales diferencias entre las 
GIs y otros estándares agrícolas—especificaciones que son únicas 
para cada GI, endógenas y basadas en prácticas de producción lo-
cal—y las consecuencias en términos de la certificación. De hecho, 
en el caso de las GIs, opciones diferentes a la certificación privada 
de terceros podrían ser mejores para asegurarse que las reglas de 
las GI se sigan, lo que podría depender del conocimiento que los 
productores y expertos tienen del producto. 
Palabras clave: indicación geográfica, control, certificación de 
terceros, estándar, ASEAN
摘要 
地理标志（Geographical indications，GIs）—即能够识别商品
源自特定地点并具备可归因于该地理来源的品质、特性和声
誉的标志—正在东南亚粮食产业中迅速发展，许多新产品由
此诞生，例如Khao Hom Mali 和 Thung Kula Rong-Hai (泰国香
米)，Kampot pepper（贡布胡椒）和Nuoc Mam Phu Quoc（越
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南鱼露）。GI推动者集中精力注册地理标志（用以保护产品
名称，抵制假冒）后，需要决定如何控制产品达到GI规范，
获得特定品质。本文分析了东南亚四国地理标志的控制和认
证程序，这四国分别是泰国、越南、柬埔寨和老挝。同时分
析了以上国家在建立高效且适宜的控制系统时面临的挑战。
受到有机农业产地的“黄金标准”认证的影响，找到适合的
地理标志控制系统是这些国家面临的困境之一。本文探讨了
地理标志和其他农业标准间的主要差异，后者对每一项地理
标志而言都是独特的、具有内源性、且基于地方生产实践。
文章还探讨了认证结果。的确，针对地理标志，比第三方认
证更能确保GI规定得以遵循的选择方式可能要依赖生产者和
内行对产品知识的把握。
 
关键词：地理标志，控制，第三方认证，标准，东盟
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Introduction
A geographical indication (GI) identifies a good as originating in a place, where a given quality, 
reputation, or any other characteristic 
of the good is essentially attributable to 
its geographical origin. GIs encourage 
diverse agricultural, food, and handi-
craft production and contribute to the 
socioeconomic dynamics of the regions 
in which they are anchored. They enable 
producers and operators to dedicate 
themselves to the commercialization of 
traditional products in response to the 
demands of quality-conscious consum-
ers while promoting regional develop-
ment (Bowen 2010). The aims of the 
legal protection conferred by the GI are 
to protect the producers against unfair 
competition and misappropriation, to 
protect consumers against a misleading 
description of the origin of the prod-
uct, and to foster international trade 
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(Crespi and Marette 2003; Rangnekar 
2004; Barham and Sylvander 2011). 
Since the implementation of the WTO 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement 1994), GI protection has 
expanded remarkably worldwide (Ev-
ans and Blakeney 2006), in particular 
in Asia. Despite different econom-
ic contexts and different GI schemes, 
Cambodia (François and Prak 2006), 
Thailand (Ngokkuen and Grote 2013), 
Vietnam (Pick, Marie-Vivien, and Bui-
Kim 2015), and Lao PDR (Marie-Vivi-
en and Chabrol 2014), all have opportu-
nities to develop high-quality products 
with a strong geographical identity, and 
have already engaged in the identifica-
tion and registration of GIs as a tool to 
expand their presence on international 
markets. 
Examples of emerging GIs in 
South-East Asia include: Khao Hom 
Mali and Thung Kula Rong-Hai fragrant 
rice (Thailand), Kampot Pepper (Cam-
bodia), Nuoc Mam Phu Quoc (Viet-
nam), or Bolaven coffee (Laos). Despite 
encouraging developments, challenges 
to maximizing GI development in the 
region persist at institutional and oper-
ational levels. One of these challenges is 
to enhance capacity for GI control. A GI 
is a signal that a product possesses cer-
tain qualities and characteristics, and 
enjoys a certain reputation related to its 
geographical origin. Such information 
is described in the GI specification, and 
compliance with the GI specifications 
by the value chain operators must be 
properly controlled to maximize trust 
by local and international buyers/con-
sumers. An independent efficient GI 
control system is consequently vital to 
allow the system to benefit all the par-
ties involved. Failure in the control sys-
tem is likely to significantly reduce the 
benefits of GI protection, and to dam-
age the image of the GI product and its 
economic prospects, both locally and 
abroad. In addition to GI control re-
quirements expressed in national laws 
and regulations (when these exist), ex-
porting GI products to foreign markets 
may also require compliance with the 
requirements of the importing country 
(Bramley, Marie-Vivien, and Biénabe 
2013). In the EU, while GIs are qualified 
as an Intellectual Property Right (IPR), 
their control system is increasingly sim-
ilar to those developed for agri-food vol-
untary standards such as “Label Rouge” 
(“Red Label” superior quality standard) 
in France {Marie-Vivien, 2017 #609} or 
organic agriculture, in which third-par-
ty certification prevails. For example, 
in France, GI control must be carried 
out by an ISO 17065 accredited certi-
fication body. We hypothesize that EU 
regulations influence domestic schemes 
for GI controls in countries willing to 
export their products to Europe, for ex-
ample in Vietnam, Lao PDR, Cambo-
dia, and Thailand. 
Many authors have studied the 
importance of third-party certification 
for voluntary standards such as organic 
agriculture or fair trade, and explain it 
in terms of neoliberal governmentality 
(Gibbon and Memedovic 2005; Guth-
man 2007; Hatanaka, Bain, and Busch 
2005). Third-party certification also 
appeals to techno-scientific values such 
as independence, objectivity, and trans-
parency in an attempt to increase trust 
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and legitimacy among customers and to 
limit liability. In contrast, the literature 
on the control of GIs is much more lim-
ited, with some works describing the 
evolution of the governance of controls 
in France {Marie-Vivien, 2017 #609}, 
the effect of the certification costs in It-
aly (Belletti et al. 2007), or the issue of 
State intervention in controls in African 
developing countries (Hughes 2009). 
Other works aim to compare the gov-
ernance of GIs with that of other volun-
tary standards (e.g., ecofriendly labels) 
by analyzing how the standard is set (its 
content) rather than how it is controlled 
(Marie-Vivien et al. 2014). 
Third-party certification is now 
clearly expressed as the preferred op-
tion by the EU regulation on GIs and 
is mandatory in France. It is, therefore, 
important to understand how the need 
for third-party certification is handled 
in countries with a burgeoning GI 
system, and how it builds on control 
mechanisms already in place for other 
voluntary standards. 
The purpose of the paper is thus 
to analyze the options for GI control in 
four Asian countries—Thailand, Cam-
bodia, Vietnam, and Laos—and to 
highlight the challenges faced by these 
countries, which have very different 
control capacities. We highlight the 
close relationship between the diffusion 
of the third-party certification model 
for GI certification in Asian countries 
and the shift in GI control in the EU 
(with a specific focus on France) from 
public bodies and collective producer 
organizations towards third-party cer-
tification. Based on desk research and 
qualitative interviews conducted in 
each country, this paper details for each 
of the four countries: the GI system, 
the control mechanisms implemented 
for GIs (when these exist), the control 
mechanisms implemented for vol-
untary/compulsory standards (when 
no GI control exists), and the control 
mechanisms in place for pilot GIs. Ulti-
mately, the paper aims to provide poli-
cymakers with relevant information on 
how to build efficient but appropriate 
GI control schemes at the country and 
regional level. 
The rest of the article is orga-
nized as follows: Section 2 describes 
the GI control system in the EU; in 
Section 3, an analytical grid is used to 
compare the GI control schemes in the 
four countries. Section 4 is dedicated to 
a discussion of the results of our survey. 
A GI Control Model 
Advocated by the EU 
1.1 Towards third-party 
certification
Drawing largely on the tradition of appellation of origin, born in France in 1905 (Sylvander, 
Casabianca, and Roncin 2008), GIs have 
been homogeneously protected in the 
EU since 1992 by Regulation 2081/92 on 
the Protection of Geographical Indica-
tions (PGI) and Designations of Origin 
(PDO) for Agricultural Products and 
Foodstuffs. This is a two-tier system: 
the PDO/PGI application is first pro-
cessed by the competent authority of the 
Member State in which the geographical 
area is located—e.g., the National Insti-
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tute for Origin and Quality (INAO) in 
France3—the application is then exam-
ined by the Directorate General for Ag-
riculture of the EU Commission.
In 2006, the EU Regulation was 
amended4 to enable foreign GIs to ben-
efit from protection within the EU and 
to introduce third-party certiﬁcation, 
as deﬁned in the EU food law. The reg-
ulation was again amended in 2012, to 
merge all quality certifications for food. 
The general EU food law principles re-
shaped the organization of controls by 
differentiating between what fell within 
the ambit of public authorities, and what 
could be delegated to private bodies.
Since EU regulation 510/2006 
was promulgated, the overall control of 
the whole PDO/PGI system has to be 
ensured by the competent authority of 
the Member State. Monitoring compli-
ance with the speciﬁcation of each PDO/
PGI can be ensured by the competent 
authority of the Member State and/or 
by a certiﬁcation body, i.e. an indepen-
dent body in charge of inspecting and 
certifying the conformity of the PDO/
PGI product with its specification, and 
accredited against the European stan-
dard EN 45011 or ISO/IEC 17 065. The 
certification body is accredited at the 
level of the Member State by the nation-
al accreditation body, which is the body 
responsible for officially recognizing the 
capability of the certification bodies to 
inspect and certify PDO/PGI specifica-
tions. The term “certiﬁcation body”, in-
3 Even though INAO is governed by a Board composed of both public and private stakeholders (see 
Marie-Vivien et al. (2017)), INAO is recognized as the national competent authority in conformity 
with the EU Regulation.
4 Regulation (EC) No. 510/2006 of March 20, 2006 on the protection of geographical indications and 
designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs. 
troduced by the 2006 regulation, marks 
the inclusion of PDO/PGI in the gen-
eral standards for product certiﬁcation 
(Gonzales Vaque 2006). Member States 
that choose a public entity to verify 
compliance with the speciﬁcations must 
offer adequate guarantees of objectivity 
and impartiality. 
1.2 The French case
Although it was not mandato-ry, France chose to shift from controls undertaken by the 
competent public authority (INAO) to 
controls undertaken by ISO 17 065-ac-
credited certiﬁcation bodies {Ma-
rie-Vivien, 2017 #609} accredited by the 
national accreditation body, COFRAC 
(French Accreditation Committee) and 
approved by INAO, which remains the 
supervisor of the control system. Be-
fore 2006, while controls were official-
ly under the authority of INAO (public 
third-party control), in practice they 
were delegated by INAO to GI produc-
er associations and were consequently 
considered as insufficiently impartial, 
especially concerning wines for which 
“arrangements” between producers 
were notorious (Olszak 2007). The ob-
jectives of shifting to third-party pri-
vate certification bodies were to meet 
the expectations of consumers, who of-
ten questioned the impartiality and the 
effectiveness of controls, and to reduce 
public spending. 
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Since 2006, in collaboration with 
the appropriate GI producer/proces-
sor organization (GI organization), for 
each PDO/PGI, the certiﬁcation body 
has been designing a control plan based 
on the GI specification drafted by the 
GI organization. The certiﬁcation body 
carries out the inspections and, based 
on the inspection reports, decides 
whether or not to grant certification. 
All costs incurred in monitoring com-
pliance with the speciﬁcation are borne 
by producers/processors. The sensory 
tests—which mainly involve tasting and 
were maintained for PDOs despite be-
ing criticized as subjective—are carried 
out by a panel of skilled producers and 
experts who can ensure that the inspec-
tion of the product is independent and 
impartial. The producer organizations 
are responsible for training their mem-
bers and forming these panels, which 
still play an important role in charac-
5 A similar shift was described for organic agriculture by Sylvander (1997) and by Muttersbaugh 
(2005).
terizing the typicity/distinctiveness of 
PDOs and in recognizing the know-
how of the producers. In addition to ex-
ternal controls by the certiﬁcation body, 
the control plan includes self-controls 
by producers/processors, and internal 
controls by the producer organization 
(audited by the certification body). 
Control by third-party certiﬁcation 
bodies ends INAO’s responsibility and 
the practice of delegating the organiza-
tion of controls to GI organizations. In 
this process, the philosophy of control 
shifts from peer review to third-party 
control.5
2.3 From gray zones to windows  
of opportunity
It is the French/EU control and certi-fication model that is now dissemi-nated to countries implementing GI 
protection schemes. Indeed, EU Reg-
Figure 1: French system of GI control
Source: Authors’ survey, using initial figure of Certipaq.
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ulation 510/2006 clearly requires that, 
in the case of foreign GIs, verification 
of compliance with GI specifications 
is to be ensured by one or more pub-
lic authorities designated by the third 
country and/or one or more product 
certification bodies, which, from May 
1, 2010 onwards, shall be EU standard 
EN 45 011 or ISO/IEC Guide 65 (now 
17 065)6-accredited. Interestingly, when 
the EU Regulation on PDO/PGI was 
amended in 20127 for GIs from third 
countries, the reference to the EN 
45  011 accreditation was dropped. In 
this context, third countries are left with 
a range of options: in October 2012, the 
Vietnamese GI Nuoc Mam Phu Quoc 
was registered in the EU as a PGI with 
a control system based on a Control 
Board8 headed by a representative of 
the Agro-Forestry-Fisheries Division 
of Phu Quoc district; in 2013, Thai GI 
Khao Hom Mali Thung Kula Rong-Hai 
rice was also registered in the EU as a 
PGI, but was certified by Bioagricert, a 
European ISO 17  065-accredited cer-
tification body. Despite this apparent 
flexibility, control by a private accred-
6 Art 11.2 of EU Regulation of 2006.
7 Regulation (EU) No. 1151/2012 of November 21, 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products 
and foodstuffs.
8 October 19, 2005 decision by the People’s Committee of Kien Giang Province approving the Reg-
ulation on the organization and operation of the Control Board for the Appellation of the Origin 
Controlled of Phu Quoc fish sauce.
9 Geographical Indication Protection Act, B.E. 2546 (2003).
10 Geographical indications were first protected by recognition of the appellation of origin introduced 
in the Civil Code of 1995, and later by the Intellectual Property Law drafted for the country’s acces-
sion to the WTO.
11 Royal Kram No. NS/RKM/0114/006 dated January 20, 2014 promulgating the Law on Geograph-
ical Indications and its Ministerial Regulation (Prakas) on the Procedure for the Registration and 
Protection of Geographical Indications of December 29, 2016, replacing Prakas no. 105 MOC/ SM 
2009 of May 18, 2009.
12 Law on Intellectual Property (No 08/NA, December 24, 2007) revised and amended by the Nation-
al Assembly in 2011 (No. 01/NA, December 20, 2011), Regulation for the implementation of the 
law of October 25, 2016.
ited third-party certification body is 
strongly advocated and largely influ-
ences the architecture of GI control sys-
tems in many countries, in particular, 
in the four countries in our study.
Appropriate for the Control 
of GIs in Southeast Asia? 
1.3 National architectures for the 
protection of GIs
Geographical Indications have been protected by sui generis law in Thailand since 2003,9 in Viet-
nam since 2005,10 in Cambodia since 
201411, and in the Lao PDR since 2011.12 
Thailand is the region’s GI champion, 
with 90 registered GIs—among which 
are 76 Thai GIs and 14 international 
GIs. Vietnam is also quite dynamic with 
52 GIs for Vietnamese products and 6 
GIs for foreign products. Finally, two 
GIs are currently registered in Cambo-
dia for Cambodian products—Kampot 
pepper and Kompeug Speu palm sugar 
and two for foreign products. The Lao 
PDR has none yet, but has two possible 
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GIs for Bolaven coffee and Khao Khai 
Noi rice and one application from a for-
eign country (Champagne).
In Thailand and Cambodia, the 
competent authority in charge of reg-
istering GIs is the Department of In-
tellectual Property (DIP) under the au-
thority of the Ministry of Commerce, 
whereas in Vietnam and Laos, the 
competent authorities are under the au-
thority of the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (the National Office of In-
tellectual Property in Vietnam and the 
Department of Intellectual Property in 
the Lao PDR).
The competent authorities are 
in charge of examining the GI applica-
tions, which will be the “standard” to 
be controlled, like in the EU. In contrast 
to the EU system, in which the nature 
of the applicant, a producer/processor 
group is always the same, the rules for 
a GI applicant are quite diverse in the 
four Asian countries. In Thailand, the 
GI applicant can either be a private enti-
ty (an individual person or a company), 
a group of producers/processors (asso-
ciation, cooperative, or non-formalized 
group), a group of consumers, or a pub-
lic authority13 (Provincial Authorities, 
the Rice Department, the Queen Sirikit 
Department of Sericulture).14 In Viet-
nam, the right to register a GI belongs 
to the State, but the State can delegate 
it to organizations and individuals who 
13 Public authorities are sometimes involved in the preparation of the GI Book of Specifications, in 
cooperation with the local communities and with the DIP GI Office.
14 Section 7 of the GI Law 2003.
15 Art. of the IP Law 2005.
16 Art.2.5 of the Lao Decision 2016 on Geographical Indications and art.7 of the GI Law of Cambodia.
17 The use of the GI National Logo is regulated by the “Department of Intellectual Property’s Regula-
tion for Thai Geographical Indication Logo Approval B.E. 2008”.
produce the product bearing the GI, 
collective organizations, or the admin-
istrative authorities of the locality to 
which the GI pertains.15 In practice, ap-
plications are often filed by the provin-
cial Department of Science and Tech-
nology, the Peoples’ Committees of the 
province/district, or the Department of 
Agriculture and Rural Development of 
the province/district. In Cambodia and 
in the Lao PDR, the producer associa-
tion is the only body authorized to ap-
ply for a GI.16
In contrast to other standards, 
what matters for the GI is the protec-
tion of a name (usually the geograph-
ical name of the location where it is 
produced). National GI logos indicat-
ing that the name is registered  as a GI 
are increasingly used, especially since 
the GI concept is new in Asia. Thailand 
has its own GI logo,17 which reads “Thai 
Geographical Indication” and “GI” in 
Thai and in English characters against 
a gold background. In Cambodia, the 
national logo for GIs was launched in 
2015 and in Lao PDR in 2016. Vietnam 
is in the process of launching its own 
logo.
The four countries have been 
following distinct pathways in imple-
menting controls and certification sys-
tems: while Thailand’s implementation 
of controls was quite gradual, Cambo-
dia immediately jumped on the certifi-
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cation bandwagon with strong support 
from France, but applied it to only two 
GIs. At the other end of the spectrum, 
control systems for GIs are still far from 
operational in Vietnam and the Lao 
PDR, although certifications systems 
have been introduced for other stan-
dards and new avenues for certification 
are being explored (e.g. Participatory 
Guarantee Systems), which could be a 
source of inspiration. 
 
1.4 National accreditation systems 
Accreditation bodies in charge of recognizing certification bod-ies’ capability to certify stan-
dards exist in Thailand and Vietnam, 
both members of the International Ac-
creditation Forum (IAF). While in Viet-
nam, the accreditation to certify the “GI 
standard” does not yet exist, Thailand 
already has a specific accreditation sys-
tem for GIs. In Cambodia, institutions 
have been created but the accreditation 
scheme for product certification bodies 
is not yet in force. In the Lao PDR, the 
national accreditation system is under 
development as several initiatives are 
currently underway to connect emerg-
ing institutions with the global arena 
(no specific action has yet been taken 
for GI certification). 
Accreditation of certification 
bodies in Thailand comes under the 
National Standardization Act B.E. 2551 
(2008) and belongs to one network, the 
18 https://www.tisi.go.th/home/en. 
19 http://www.acfs.go.th/eng/. 
20 Certification bodies that are already accredited by ACFS to certify standards such as GAP, GMP, 
and HACCP will be able to certify GIs.
21 http://www.boa.gov.vn/en. 
National Accreditation Council, under 
the Ministry of Industry.18 The network 
includes several accreditation agencies 
including the National Bureau of Ag-
ricultural Commodity and Food Stan-
dards (ACFS), which is in charge of 
accrediting certification bodies for ag-
ricultural commodities and food prod-
ucts.19 In 2012, the DIP signed a Mem-
orandum of Understanding with ACFS 
and the Thai Industrial Standards Insti-
tute on Cooperation for Certification 
and Recognition of Geographical In-
dications. The ACFS must now submit 
to the IAF an official request to include 
GIs as a standard to be certified besides 
other standards such as GAP (good 
agricultural practices) that are already 
recognized by IAF. Once this procedure 
is completed, the ACFS GI accredita-
tion scheme will be internationally rec-
ognized as ISO 17 065-accredited by all 
members of the IAF.20 In the meantime, 
the ACFS can accredit certification 
bodies using Thai standards for GI cer-
tification.
In Vietnam, the accreditation 
body is the Bureau of Accreditation 
(BoA) established in 1995 under STA-
MEQ, the Directorate for Standards, 
Metrology and Quality of the Ministry 
of Science and Technology.21 The BoA 
offers accreditation programs for lab-
oratories, certification bodies, and in-
spection bodies, for the certification of 
compulsory and voluntary standards, 
be they domestic, foreign, regional, or 
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international. Voluntary standards in 
agro-food products include VietGap 
(Vietnam Good Agricultural Practices), 
safe vegetables, and organic agriculture. 
The BoA’s accreditation programs op-
erate according to international stan-
dards. The Vietnam Certification Ac-
creditation Scheme (VICAS) is one of 
these programs. At the time of writing, 
certification bodies are only accredited 
to certify VIETGAP (not GIs).
The Cambodian Ministry of In-
dustry and Handicraft has set up an 
Institute of Standards. A new product 
certification scheme conforming to the 
requirements of the ISO/IEC Guide 65 
is currently being developed. The De-
partment of Accreditation, created in 
2016, is the authority responsible for 
Accreditation of Conformity Assess-
ment Bodies, but Cambodia does not 
yet have an accredited body for GI cer-
tification.22
The Lao PDR is currently set-
ting up the Lao National Accreditation 
Bureau (LNAB) to be hosted by the 
Ministry of Science and Technology 
(Department of Standardization and 
Metrology) with the support of ASE-
AN’s Consultative Committee on Stan-
dards and Quality (ACCSQ), which 
organizes training courses to strength-
en accreditation services in Cambodia, 
Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam. The 
LNAB will be in charge of granting, 
22 http://www.da-canc.gov.kh/en and http://www.isc.gov.kh/en/. 
23 Decree on the Implementation of the Law on Standardization (June 2012). 
24 ACT 2534 revised by ACT (No.5) BE 2545 (Art.1 point 5.1)
25 In 2015, 15 GIs used the Thai National GIs Logo; 39 GIs had the GIs Manual; 35 GIs had an Internal 
Control Plan; and 27 GIs also had a Committee to coordinate the control activity, take decisions, 
and verify the internal control. Of these 27, 19 had a “Provincial Committee”. However, this system 
is not recognized internationally.
maintaining, extending, suspending, 
and withdrawing accreditation to lab-
oratories and conformity assessment 
bodies, among which are certification 
bodies.23 Once the LNAB is fully oper-
ational, certification bodies will be able 
to be accredited locally and will no lon-
ger have to rely on foreign accreditation 
services.
 
1.5 Certification and control 
schemes for Geographical 
Indications
In Thailand, the law does not require a control mechanism for the use of the GI, i.e. the use of the name 
protected as a GI. This is different for 
producers/processors willing to use the 
Thai national GI logo. The producers/
processors group must file an appli-
cation with the DIP and develop a GI 
operating manual and a control plan.24 
In practice, the control plan is generally 
prepared with the support of the pub-
lic authorities and is first implemented 
by the group of producers/processors 
(internal control) followed by exter-
nal control by a Provincial Committee 
composed of individuals from the DIP, 
the local authorities, and producers/
processors. The external control can be 
delegated by the Provincial Committee 
to the Province or to another public 
agency.25 If there is no producer/pro-
cessor group, the Provincial Committee 
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can directly control all producers/pro-
cessors.
The new 2012 regulation allows 
ISO 17  065-accredited certification 
bodies to inspect and issue certificates 
for Thai GIs. This is a voluntary choice 
of the GI producer/processor groups. 
Such a certification body can be ac-
credited by the EU or by the Thai ACFS 
once the new GI accreditation scheme 
is effective. The Thai system thus allows 
GI producers/processors to choose be-
tween several control options.
In Vietnam, in the absence of a 
homogeneous national system, rules 
for managing GIs, i.e. granting and re-
voking the right to use the GI, are very 
diverse. The right to use the GI is grant-
ed by the management body (the public 
authority that registered the GI), but is 
not conditional upon control of com-
pliance of the product to the GI spec-
ification, even if in some cases control 
boards were created. The control board 
usually comprises representatives from 
the Directorate for Standards, Metrol-
ogy and Quality (STAMEQ) under the 
MoST, at the Provincial level. Initial-
ly involved in the creation of the GI 
for Nuoc Mam Phu Quoc (fish sauce), 
NAFIQAD (National Agro-Forest-
ry-Fisheries Quality Assurance Depart-
ment, under the Ministry of Agricul-
ture) mainly controls compliance with 
mandatory food safety regulations and 
with some voluntary standards such as 
VietGAP through a network of labo-
ratories scattered around the country. 
It considers that State agencies should 
not be involved in the control of volun-
tary standards such as GIs. NAFIQAD 
is funded by the State and by certifica-
tion fees. Hai Phong Branch employs 15 
people for laboratory analyses, 15 peo-
ple for certification, and 10 people for 
administrative work. Each department 
of the Ministry of Agriculture and Ru-
ral Development (MARD) is in charge 
of accrediting certification agencies 
against specific standards, which cre-
ates considerable confusion: e.g., the 
Department of Crop Production is in 
Figure 2: GI control system in Thailand
Source: Authors’ survey.
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charge of accrediting agencies for Vi-
etGap for crops, while the Department 
of Livestock is in charge of accrediting 
agencies for VietGap for livestock.
No certification bodies inspect 
GIs, although there are many private 
Vietnamese certification bodies accred-
ited by foreign accreditation organiza-
tions, such as Vinacert, which certifies 
mangoes from Hoa Loc, tea from Van 
Chan, and tea from Yen Bai against Vi-
etGAP. In the absence of Vietnamese 
organic agriculture standards, foreign 
certification bodies—e.g., Organic Ag-
riculture Thailand (ACT) in Thailand—
certify that Vietnamese products com-
ply with foreign organic agriculture 
standards. This is the case of organic tea 
from Yen Bai, or organic star anise from 
Lang Son, two GI products.
The GI control system devel-
oped by Cambodia is very similar to 
the French system. It is detailed and 
includes an internal control by the GI 
association, and is funded by a fee paid 
26  Art.26 and 27 of the GI Law 2014 and art.37 to 41 of the Prakas of 2016.
by all members (producers, processors, 
packagers) of the GI association, an ex-
ternal control by a private or public ISO 
17  065-accredited certification body, 
chosen by the GI association and ap-
proved by the Ministry of Commerce, 
the authority responsible for official 
controls.26 The certification body au-
dits the internal control system and 
inspects a subsample of GI association 
members. As Cambodia does not yet 
have an accreditation system for GI or 
Cambodian certification bodies that 
would be internationally recognized, 
the two Cambodian GIs are controlled 
and certified by foreign certification 
bodies accredited in the EU. Indeed, the 
only certification body in the country is 
the Cambodian Organic Agriculture 
Association (COrAA), a small private 
organization in the sector promoting 
organic agriculture in Cambodia that 
is not recognized internationally but 
conducts a few inspections each year 
for foreign certification bodies willing 
to certify foreign standards (e.g., GAP, 
Figure 3: GI control system in Vietnam
Source: Authors’ survey.
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organic). No laboratories are accredited 
to carry out analytical tests.
The Kampot pepper GI is a per-
fect illustration of how a multi-tiered 
system can work. It combines: (i) 
self-control at the producer/processor 
level (each producer/processor verifies 
the requirements of the specification 
using the “auto check list”); (ii) inspec-
tion of all the members of the GI asso-
ciation by the 18 inspectors working 
for the association’s internal control 
system; (iii) inspection of 30% of the 
producer/processor and of the internal 
control system by Ecocert, the certifica-
tion body. In 2014, 20% of the pepper 
producers and 100% of the companies 
were reinspected by the external body. 
The organoleptic characteristics of the 
Kampot Pepper GI were verified by a 
sensory analysis panel. These checks 
showed that 95% of the producers 
kept their records properly, and that 
only a few needed to improve their re-
cord-keeping. Both the internal and the 
external control systems were satisfac-
tory. Certification costs were borne by 
the GI association, owing to success-
ful domestic and international sales of 
Kampot pepper.
The GI certification system in the 
Lao PDR is patterned after the French 
system. The DIP is the competent au-
thority for official controls. Control of 
compliance with the GI specifications 
must be carried out by a certification/
control body that is (1) legally regis-
tered or authorized to provide control 
or certification activities in Lao PDR 
and (2) 17 065-accredited. The certifi-
cation/control body has to send an an-
nual report to the DIP including a list 
of certified producers, operators, prod-
ucts, quantities, and measures taken, if 
any. This system has not yet been im-
plemented.
Since 2008, the national insti-
tution Lao Certification is in charge of 
providing certification services to the 
agriculture and food sectors. Currently 
it inspects and certifies that producers 
and producer groups comply with Lao 
national organic standards and national 
Figure 4: GI control system in Cambodia
Source: Authors’ survey.
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standards for Good Agricultural Prac-
tices issued by the Ministry of Agricul-
ture. The LCB is under the auspices of 
the Standard and Accreditation Divi-
sion of the Department of Agriculture 
within the Ministry of Agriculture. It 
currently employs 12 permanent staff. 
The inspectors at LCB were trained 
by inspectors from the Department of 
Agriculture, Agriculture Certification 
Thailand (ACT), and the Thai Organic 
Trader Association (TOTA). Around 
20 organic inspections of organic farms 
are currently conducted throughout the 
country each year. As there are no in-
spectors at the provincial and district 
levels, the inspectors cannot monitor 
the producer groups under their re-
sponsibility very closely. Operational 
ICSs have been developed for organic 
rice and vegetables (Vientiane Capital), 
the future GI Bolaven coffee (Cham-
passak Province), and the future GI 
Khao Khai Noi (Xiengkhouang and 
Huaphanh provinces). Farmers are 
usually inspected once a year. The in-
spection process lasts between 2/3 days 
and a week, depending on the number 
of farmers to be inspected in a group. 
Inspection of paperwork is usually fol-
lowed by field inspections. Total certi-
fication costs depend on the size of the 
area to be inspected and certified and 
on the number of farmers involved, and 
may vary from 100,000 to 1,000,000 
LAK (US$13-125). Organic Agricul-
ture Certification Thailand (ACT) is the 
main certification body that performs 
inspections and certifies that products 
comply with foreign organic standards. 
For products for export, ACT current-
ly invites LCB inspectors to take part 
in the inspection process to gain expe-
rience. However, the final certification 
process is carried out by ACT alone. 
Other foreign certification bodies op-
erating in the Lao PDR include: BCS 
(Germany), ICEA (Italy), and Bioagri-
cert (Italy), all of which operate from 
Thailand.
Table 1 summarizes and com-
pares the GI systems in the four coun-
tries, underlining the difference be-
tween the approaches.
Figure 5: GI control system of the Lao PDR
Source: Authors’ survey.
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Discussion
1.6 Choosing the “right” 
certification model
Existing laws and regulations in Southeast Asia already provide for a GI control system. As they 
are not yet fully operational, we con-
sider that several options are still open 
for drafting a credible certification sys-
tem that is not prohibitively costly for 
the producers and remains manageable 
by local institutions. As certification is 
costly, to be sustainable it must be off-
Table 1:  Comparison between the GI systems in Southeast Asia
Source: Authors’ survey.
Thailand Vietnam Cambodia Lao PDR
Year of IP 
Law
2003 2005 2009 2011
Competent 
authority
MoC
DIP
MoST
NOIP
MoC
DIP
MoST
DIP
GI applicant Private entity, 
group of 
producers, 
public 
authorities
Local public 
authorities 
(can delegate to 
the producers, 
collective 
organizations)
Association Association
External 
control
Certification 
bodies 
or public 
authorities—
operational
Public 
authorities
(Little 
operational)
Certification 
bodies 
(operational)
Certification 
bodies (not 
operational)
Accreditation 
body
National 
Standardization 
Council 
(member of 
IAF)
Bureau of 
Accreditation 
(member of 
IAF)
Department of 
Accreditation 
(not a member 
of IAF)
National 
Accreditation 
Board (not 
operational, 
not a member 
of IAF)
GI national 
logo In process
N° of 
registered GIs
76+14 52+6 2+2 -
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set by higher prices, which is seldom 
the case for new products that may not 
yet enjoy a reputation of uniqueness 
and quality beyond the borders of the 
producer country. Financing internal 
and external controls through member 
fees like in Europe does not seem ap-
propriate for a burgeoning GI system 
that is not well remunerated because it 
not very well known by consumers. The 
EU model was successful for Kampot 
pepper, which benefits from a high pre-
mium on the international market, but 
its costs may be the reason why so few 
GIs have been registered in Cambodia 
since then.
Moreover, certification requires 
an entirely different attitude by the 
farmers, as they not only need to do 
things differently, but must also be able 
to prove that they actually do so. Expe-
rience in the four countries shows that 
it is often difficult for farmers and local 
communities to cope with the detailed 
technical requirements and to under-
stand the need to “write what they do 
and do what they write” on a regular 
basis, as is often requested. This is likely 
to be the case for GI products that need 
to be traced from the farm to the fork. 
It may also be difficult for farmers to 
understand and follow the application 
process without external support (e.g., 
from an NGO) and in the absence of 
properly trained extension officers. The 
Lao Certification Body is severely un-
derstaffed and has no representatives at 
the district level to regularly train the 
farmers on certification procedures and 
paperwork, and on the importance of 
documenting farming practices.
Verification and certification 
systems are likely to be shaped by the 
distance to the final market on which 
the GI product will be sold, their cost, 
and by the financial and human assets 
available at both the farmer’s and insti-
tutional level.
In the end, three main options 
exist for GI control:
(1) Control by 17 065-accredited 
certification bodies seems to be the best 
guarantee for access to distant markets. 
It guarantees that all members of the GI 
group apply the GI specifications in the 
same way. This is an important step to 
avoid the misuse of the GI name and 
logo. This certification system makes it 
more difficult for fraudulent operators 
outside the group to produce GI prod-
uct counterfeits as these operators will 
not have the GI certificate to prove the 
authenticity of their products. Such a 
system could be implemented either by 
foreign certification bodies or, better by 
far, by domestic certification bodies. In-
deed, domestic certification bodies are 
more appropriate and efficient than for-
eign certification bodies, as they do not 
have to face the problem of language 
barriers, they can adjust producer’s vis-
its to the production cycle, they cost 
less, and share the same culture with 
those they control. Domestic certifica-
tion bodies can be locally accredited, 
which is the case of Vinacert, Mekong-
cert (Vietnam), ACT (Thailand), and 
the Lao Certification Body. Local certi-
fication bodies are evidence of a sense 
of ownership by local stakeholders. 
However, as accreditation is also a long, 
costly, and difficult process, in coun-
World Food Policy
122
tries where different standards may be 
under the responsibility of different 
ministries, it may be difficult to avoid 
the multiplication of accreditation and 
certification bodies, each ministry con-
sidering itself as fully legitimate. This is 
more likely to be the case as the number 
of voluntary standards increases (e.g. 
organic, safe, clean, VietGap, ThaiGap, 
ASEANGap).
(2) Control by a “Board” or “Com-
mittee”: the Thai system, which offers 
the possibility for the GI association to 
choose its system of control (accredited 
certification body, Provincial Commit-
tee), allows the GI to be launched with-
out charging the operators for certifica-
tion costs from the very beginning. The 
problem of cost also justifies the choice 
made in Vietnam. Indeed, in most cases 
the producers/processors cannot afford 
such costs at the beginning of the activ-
ity, but are able to do so later on once 
the GI product is better remunerated 
on the market. These Control boards or 
Provincial committees bring together 
experts from DIP/NOIP, local authori-
ties, experts on the product, and experts 
in control/certification. One possible 
disadvantage of this control system is 
that control is not always optimal or 
may even not work at all because of lack 
of skilled human resources to conduct 
inspection and possible difficulties in 
coordinating such multi-stakeholder 
boards.
(3) Control by participatory gua- 
rantee systems (PGSs)27 are particularly 
27 Defined by IFOAM as “a quality assurance system for clusters based on an active participation of 
all the stakeholders and on the establishment of trust, social systems and knowledge exchanges be-
tween farmers, consumers and members involved” (IFOAM, 20xx). These alternative certification 
systems PGS are close to peer-to-peer systems.
appropriate for short value chains (local 
and domestic markets) as they enable 
producers to reduce certification costs 
and communities to engage in a learn-
ing process. They are also a very inter-
esting instrument to raise consumer 
awareness about issues related to food 
quality. Indeed, PGSs allow greater 
communication and learning between 
farmers and consumers, as well as more 
information-sharing not only between 
the farmers themselves, but also with 
other segments of the value chain. PGSs 
are currently very popular in Vietnam. 
In terms of overall strategy, there 
seems to be some rationale for the 
creation of “one-stop shops for certi-
fication”. Bringing all agri-food certifi-
cations under the umbrella of a single 
certification body (national or region-
al) would make it possible for operators 
willing to access multiple certifications 
to benefit from economies of scale, pro-
vided that several certifications can be 
granted after a single inspection (e.g., 
organic, GAP, GIs, mandatory food 
safety regulations). This system would 
also enable inspectors from the certifi-
cation body to attain a critical mass of 
activities to be fully operational, and 
not lose their skills. Such a system al-
ready exists for voluntary food stan-
dards, with certification bodies propos-
ing certification packages that include 
a broad range of certifications (Djama, 
Fouilleux, and Vagneron 2011). 
In parallel, and during the tran-
sition period until fully operational na-
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tional certification bodies are in place, 
it is important to encourage ongoing ef-
forts toward regional cooperation in the 
area of certification. As multiple accred-
itations are costly and time-consuming, 
certification bodies tend to develop 
partnerships based on a strategy of spe-
cialization in either a geographic loca-
tion or an accreditation. The Certifica-
tion Alliance, a collaborative platform 
for regional certification, is an interest-
ing example of such cooperation. Based 
on the premises that local certification 
may not be viable in countries where 
there are only a small number of opera-
tors, Certification Alliance offers an in-
ternationally accredited inspection and 
certification service to local operators 
as well as collaboration between mem-
bers on information-sharing, learning 
and capacity-building in inspection 
and certification. On this platform, col-
laboration among different certification 
bodies allows each member to benefit 
from a menu of certifications. Local in-
spectors accompany experts from oth-
er member organizations during their 
inspections, and learn from the expe-
rience. In 2008, the Lao Certification 
Body joined this platform along with 
eight other Asian organic certification 
bodies.
Finally, while the European sys-
tem designates a GI-competent author-
ity to supervise the control scheme for 
GIs (INAO in France), such supervision 
of the control scheme by the GI nation-
al competent authority is questionable 
in the four countries concerned here. 
As they are currently learning the fun-
damental principles of internationally 
recognized certification procedures, 
it may be wiser not to further com-
plicate matters by adding mandatory 
coordination of controls between the 
authorities in charge of accreditation 
and certification and those in charge of 
geographical indications (intellectual 
property department or office) to avoid 
extra costs of co-management. 
 
1.7 In the end, are GIs really 
equivalent to standards?
Standards imply a certain level of codification. In this respect, GIs are different from other stan-
dards: each GI specification is a unique 
standard, and inspectors need to tru-
ly understand the history and specific 
quality/uniqueness of the GI product. 
Furthermore, the uniqueness of the GI 
product may make it difficult to trans-
late all its properties in the technical 
specifications without ending up with 
a very complicated document that is 
both unverifiable and unmanageable. 
For example, the experience of Kam-
pot Pepper shows that having too many 
points to control (42 control points) is 
overly difficult and inefficient. The con-
trol points should be classified between 
major and minor points and the senso-
rial analysis should not be undermined: 
more importance should be given to the 
sensorial analysis and tasting panels as 
GIs give added value to typicity and or-
ganoleptic quality.
Another specificity of GIs is their 
collective nature. Each GI is a standard 
built on the practices of a group of pro-
ducers/processors located in a specific 
place that created a product with a rep-
utation. The group of producers/pro-
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cessors is thus essential not only when 
setting up the GI application, but also 
when implementing the internal con-
trol. Internal control was the main con-
trol in France before 2006, under the 
supervision of INAO. Internal control 
is critical as it paves the way for lighter, 
easier external control, enables farm-
ers to share and learn from each other, 
and reduces the risk of non-compli-
ance. External control can be facilitated 
by strong efficient internal control: for 
Kampot Pepper, only 16 farmers were 
subjected to external control. 
Conclusion
This article presents the GI con-trol systems that are currently emerging in Southeast Asia, and 
highlights the difficulties encountered 
at various levels in making these sys-
tems both operational and credible, yet 
at a reasonable cost. While certification 
by internationally accredited third-par-
ty certification bodies is generally pre-
sented as the gold standard, it might not 
be the most suitable system for GIs, in 
terms of costs, sharing, and learning. 
Furthermore, a careful look at the latest 
version of the EU Regulation of 2012 
shows that, for foreign GIs, third-party 
certification might not even be a pre-
condition for entering EU markets. Fi-
nally, an increasing number of foreign 
GIs are protected in Europe through 
bilateral agreements that include a list 
of GIs to be protected in the signato-
ry countries of the agreement, without 
having to rely on the provisions of the 
EU Regulation on GIs. In this sense, 
GIs are much more flexible than the 
EU organic agriculture standard, which 
requires a 17  065 certification system 
or a system judged to be equivalent to 
the European system. This means that 
countries willing to export GI products 
still have considerable latitude in the 
design of their certification schemes, 
and should consider several options in 
the light of the cost, the level of farmers’ 
knowledge and awareness, and the do-
mestic control capacities, with the aim 
of implementing efficient control.
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